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“We then sailed on up the narrow strait with wailing. For on one side
lay Scylla and on the other divine Charybdis terribly sucked down the
salt water of the sea.” 1
INTRODUCTION
In 2008, the United States Supreme Court reset the landscape of
the Second Amendment when it issued its landmark decision in
District of Columbia v. Heller. 2 The Court held for the first time that
the Second Amendment right to “keep and bear arms” was an
individual right unconnected with any militia service. 3 Two years after
this watershed decision, the Court took the inevitable next step in
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2018, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A., History, DePaul University, 2012.
1
HOMER, THE ODYSSEY BOOK XII. (Translated by A.T. Murray; Cambridge,
MA, Harvard University Press, 1919).
2
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554. U.S. 570 (2008).
3
Id. at 595.

51

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2017

1

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 3

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 13

Fall 2017

McDonald v. City of Chicago and held that the individual right
recognized in Heller was fully applicable to state and local
governments via incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment. 4
Justice John Paul Stevens warned in his dissent in McDonald that
the Court’s decision would lead to “an avalanche of litigation that
would mire federal courts in fine-grained determinations about which
state and local regulations comport with the Heller right—the precise
contours of which are far from pellucid.” 5 Indeed, Heller did not fully
define the scope of this newly recognized Second Amendment right,
nor did it include a standard of review for how the lower courts were
to enforce it. 6 Now, because of McDonald, these same lower courts
faced the daunting prospect of reviewing a seemingly endless array of
state and local gun control legislation with little guidance from the
Supreme Court on the proper Second Amendment analytical
framework. 7
In the void left by the Supreme Court, a majority of the Federal
Circuit Courts of Appeals eventually settled on a two-step means-end
framework similar in many ways to the framework used for challenges
under the First Amendment. 8 However, state and local officials and
gun control advocates still faced an uncertain path forward. Advocates
and legislators had to determine what regulations remained viable and
worth pursuing to combat gun violence in the new constitutional
regime of the Second Amendment. 9 Some gun-control advocates
remained hopeful that the Heller and McDonald decisions would have
4

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, [] (2010).
Id. at 904 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
6
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 718 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Because [the Court’s
decision] says little about the standards used to evaluate regulatory decisions, it will
leave the Nation without clear standards for resolving those challenges.”).
7
See generally, Stacey L. Sobel, The Tsunami of Legal Uncertainty: What's A
Court to Do Post-McDonald? 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 489, 492 (2012).
8
See infra at Section IB.
9
See, e.g., Ian W. Henderson, Rights, Regulations, and Revolvers: Baltimore
City's Complex Constitutional Challenge Following District of Columbia v. Heller.,
39 U. BALT. L. REV. 423, 454 (2010) (“The most pertinent question presented by the
Supreme Court's decision in Heller relates to what degree cities like Baltimore will
have to scale back gun regulations.”).
5
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a limited affect on other gun control measures across the country. 10
Although the Supreme Court had declared total bans on handgun
ownership unconstitutional, advocates maintained that there was still a
“broad range of gun regulation that remain[ed] presumptively legal.” 11
While it is true that in the years following Heller and McDonald a
range of federal, state, and local gun regulations were upheld by courts
across the United States, 12 the same is not necessarily true for the
jurisdiction where McDonald originated: the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals. The Seventh Circuit, with some exceptions, has steadily
expanded the scope of the Second Amendment right first recognized in
Heller, and it has repeatedly struck down state and local gun control
measures as unconstitutional. 13
The most recent example of this trend is the case of Ezell v
City of Chicago (Ezell II), decided in January of 2017. 14 Ezell II was
the second round of litigation aimed at multiple Chicago gun control
ordinances which the city had put in place after its total handgun ban
had been invalidated by the Supreme Court in McDonald. 15 Ezell II
specifically involved various city ordinances setting zoning and

10

See Robert Barnes and Dan Eagen, Supreme Court Affirms Fundamental
Right to Bear Arms, WASHINGTON POST (June 29, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/28/
AR2010062802134.html ("Over the long run, this apparent victory for gun rights
may be more symbol than substance. It's actually a very narrow holding.").
11
See Scott Neuman, Supreme Court Strikes Down Chicago Hand Gun Ban,
NPR.ORG (June 28, 2010), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2010/06/28/128163284/supreme-court-strikes-down-chicago-handgun-ban
(quoting Dennis Henigan, Vice President at the Brady Center to Prevent Gun
Violence).
12
See generally, Stephen Kiehl, In Search of a Standard: Gun Regulations
After Heller and McDonald, 70 MD. L. REV. 1131, 1151 (2011) (arguing that the
response to Heller and McDonald was muted and that “[l]ower courts have been
reluctant to read Heller and McDonald as inviting open season on gun regulations”).
13
See discussion and cases cited infra at Section II.
14
Ezell v. City of Chicago, 846 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2017) (hereinafter “Ezell
II”).
15
Id. at 889-90.
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distancing restrictions on the construction of live firing ranges, as well
as a restriction on minors’ access to such ranges. 16
A divided three judge Seventh Circuit panel struck down the
ordinances as unconstitutional. 17 Circuit Judge Diane Sykes wrote the
majority opinion, in which she applied a “sliding scale” form of the
two-step means-end test used by other circuits for Second Amendment
claims and subjected the regulations to a heightened level of review
akin to strict scrutiny. 18 Judge Illana Rovner wrote a concurrence,
dissenting in part, where she argued that some of the restrictions
should have withstood constitutional scrutiny. 19 Judge Rovner also had
notably disagreed with the same majority and their use of the two-step
means-end test in the previous iteration of the case Ezell I. 20
This article examines Ezell II in the context of the current state of
Second Amendment jurisprudence in the Seventh Circuit and the
Federal Courts at large, an area of constitutional law which is still in
its relative infancy. This article argues that the sliding scale means-end
test the majority articulated and used in Ezell I & II was not properly
applied to Chicago’s firing range ordinances. Furthermore, this article
argues that the level of heightened scrutiny the court used in Ezell I
and applied again in Ezell II, which appeared to be strict scrutiny, was
inappropriate and out of sync with the level of scrutiny that has been
applied in the majority of other circuits in comparable cases.
Part I of this article examines the background of Heller and
McDonald, and the two-step means-end framework developed by the
Circuit Courts to apply the decisions to a range of federal and local
gun control regulations. Part II looks at the Seventh Circuit’s Second
Amendment jurisprudence prior to Ezell II, and the background of the
16

Id. at 890.
Id.
18
See generally, id. at 892-93. As will be discussed further infra, Judge Sykes
used different labels in Ezell I and Ezell II for the level of scrutiny being applied, but
Judge Rovner noted in her opinion in Ezell I that it appeared to be strict scrutiny.
19
See id. at 898-900 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
20
See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 711 (7th Cir. 2011) (Rovner, J.,
concurring) (hereinafter “Ezell I”).
17
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case, including the important decision in Ezell I. Part III examines the
decision and the different opinions in Ezell II and argues that the
majority incorrectly applied the two-step means-end scrutiny test, both
in terms of the heightened level of scrutiny selected by Judge Sykes
and how it was applied to the regulations at issue.
2016 marked a record year for gun violence in Chicago, and 2017
has shown little signs of improvement. 21 In Ezell II, Judge Rover
expressed her “sympathy for the City's difficult path between this
Scylla and Charybdis,” as they attempt to combat gun violence while
navigating the Constitutional reality imposed by Heller and
McDonald. 22 Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit in Ezell II further
narrowed the path forward for Chicago city officials to craft
meaningful gun control ordinances that can survive constitutional
scrutiny.
I.

BACKGROUND: HELLER & MCDONALD, AND THE NEW SECOND
AMENDMENT LANDSCAPE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

When the Supreme Court issued its decision in Heller, it marked
the first time in nearly 70 years that the highest court in the United
States had tackled the Second Amendment. 23 The prior case, Miller v.
United States in 1939, did not contain much elaboration on the scope
of the Second Amendment. 24 Miller involved a challenge to a state ban
on sawed-off shotguns which the Court upheld as constitutional under
the Second Amendment. 25 The Court concluded that there was a lack
of evidence showing “some reasonable relationship” between the use
of a sawed-off shot gun and “the preservation or efficiency of a well

21

Azadeh Ansari and Rosa Flores, Chicago’s 762 homicides in 2016 is highest
in 19 years, CNN.COM (Jan. 2, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/01/us/chicagomurders-2016/index.html.
22
Ezell II, 846 F.3d at 898.
23
See Miller v United States, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
24
See Henderson, supra note 9, at 432.
25
Id., citing Miller, 307 U.S. at 174.
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regulated militia,” and remanded the case for further proceedings,
which did not occur. 26
Although the opaque language of the Miller opinion led to
decades of debate among courts and commentators as to the scope of
the Court’s Second Amendment holding, 27 the language in the opinion
did appear to strongly suggest the Court’s view that the Second
Amendment right to bear arms was only connected to militia service. 28
Regardless of the merits of this view, the interpretation that the right to
keep and bear arms is tied to militia service was foreclosed when the
Supreme Court issued its landmark ruling in Heller.
A. D.C v. Heller & McDonald v. City of Chicago: The Supreme
Court Resets the Stage on the Second Amendment
The District of Columbia’s total ban on hand gun ownership was
the strictest gun control regulation in the country, and a ripe target for
gun rights advocates. 29 A leading libertarian think-tank spent years
strategically assembling the perfect “law-abiding” plaintiffs to
challenge the law and finally achieve judicial recognition of an
individual right to keep and bear arms. 30 The group found its ideal

26

Id. No further proceedings occurred because the original defendant Miller
had died, and the remaining defendant struck a plea deal after the Supreme Court’s
decision. See Id.
27
See David B. Kopel & Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The Federal Circuits’ Second
Amendment Doctrines, 61 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 193, 208-09 (2017).
28
See Henderson, supra note 9, at 432. As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent
in Heller, virtually every Court of Appeals to interpret Miller understood it to hold
that “the Second Amendment does not protect the right to possess and use guns for
purely private, civilian purposes. D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 n.2 (2008) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (listing cases).
29
Linda Greenhouse, Justices, Ruling 5-4, Endorse Personal Right to Own
Gun, NY TIMES (June 27, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/27/washington/27scotus.html?mcubz=0
30
Adam Liptak Carefully Plotted Course Propels Gun Case to Top, NY TIMES
(Dec. 3, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/03/us/03bar.html

56

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol13/iss1/3

6

: Between Scylla and Charybdis: <i>Ezell v. City of Chicago (Ezell

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 13

Fall 2017

plaintiff in Dick Heller, a security guard who carried a gun on duty but
was denied a license by the District to keep his firearm in his home. 31
In a bitterly split opinion, the Court in Heller ruled that the
District’s ban was unconstitutional.32 The Court held that the Second
Amendment conferred an individual right to “possess a firearm
unconnected with service in a militia,” as well as the right to use that
arm for “traditionally lawful purposes such as self defense in the
home.” 33 In a sprawling opinion for the majority, Justice Scalia relied
on what some scholars have called “new originalsm” principles by
looking at the “text, history and tradition” of the Second Amendment
to conclude that it conferred an individual right. 34 Additionally, Justice
Scalia argued that the text and history indicated that the central core of
an individual’s Second Amendment right was the “inherent right of
self-defense.” 35 By casting the Second Amendment in this way—as
protecting an individual right to keep a firearm in the home for selfdefense—the Court found that the District’s ban was necessarily
unconstitutional. 36
Justice Stevens wrote a highly critical dissent in which he called
the majority opinion a “strained and unpersuasive reading” of the
Second Amendment’s text and history. 37 Justice Stevens presented his
own historical and textual analysis to argue that the right to keep and
bare arms under the Second Amendment was solely connected to
31

Greenhouse, supra note 29; D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 574 (2008).
Heller, 554 U.S. at 570.
33
Id.
34
See Nicholas Griepsma, Concealed Carry Through Common Use: Extending
Heller's Constitutional Construction, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 284, 286 (2017). For a
more thorough discussion of originalsm in the context of Heller, see generally
Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 923, 924 (2009). For a counter view to the generally accepted wisdom that
Heller represents a paradigmatic “Originalist” opinion, see Robert Leider, Our NonOriginalist Right to Bear Arms, 89 IND. L.J. 1587, 1650 (2014) (arguing Heller
represented “popular constitutionalism” and remade the Second Amendment around
its current popular understanding).
35
Heller, 554 U.S. at 628.
36
See id. at 630.
37
Heller, 554 U.S. at 639 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
32
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militia service, and that neither the text nor the history presented by
the majority “evidenced the slightest interest” on the part of the
Founders “in limiting any legislature's authority to regulate private
civilian uses of firearms.” 38
Justice Breyer also wrote a dissent arguing for an “interestbalancing inquiry” whereby the interests protected by the Second
Amendment would be weighted against the public safety interests of
the government to determine “whether the regulation at issue
impermissibly burdens the former in the course of advancing the
latter.” 39 The majority opinion expressly rejected Justice Breyer’s
proposed framework, which is ironic given the interest balancing that
is an inherent part of the two-step means-end test that would emerge in
the lower courts. 40
Apart from its principle holding recognizing the individual right
to keep and bear arms in the home for the purposes of self defense, the
Court in Heller declined to “clarify the entire field” of the Second
Amendment. 41 The Court did note, however, that the right was not
“unlimited” 42 and indicated that many areas of gun regulation
remained “presumptively lawful.” 43 The Court cautioned that:
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government
buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on
the commercial sale of arms. 44

38

Id. at 637.
Id. at 689 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
40
See generally, Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer's Triumph in the Third Battle
over the Second Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 711 (2012).
41
Heller, 554 U.S at 635.
42
Id. at 595.
43
See Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 27, at 214.
44
Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27.
39
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Additionally, in an attempt to square its holding with the cryptic ruling
in Miller, 45 the Court stated that the Second Amendment “does not
protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens
for lawful purposes.” 46 Furthermore, the Second Amendment did not
protect “dangerous and unusual” weapons. 47 Apart from sawed-off
shot guns and “machineguns,” however, the court did not explicitly
point to other types of “unusual” weapons not typically used for
“lawful purposes.” 48
Notably absent from the Heller majority’s discussion of Second
Amendment principles 49 was any concrete standard of review. 50 The
Court only stated that the District’s ban would fail under “any of the
standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated
constitutional right,” 51 though the Court later conceded in a footnote
that the law would likely pass rational-basis review “like almost all
laws” would. 52 The only standard the Court seemed to foreclose was
rational basis, stating that the test was not appropriate for evaluating
legislative regulation of a “specific, enumerated right” under the Bill
of Rights. 53 Justice Breyer was critical of the majority leaving the
lower courts “without clear standards” for resolving future Second
Amendment disputes, and he warned that without clear standards the
45

See Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 27, at 214.
Heller, 554 U.S. at 625.
47
Id. at 627.
48
Id.at 624-25 (“We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second
Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding
citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.”). The Court did
indicate that current bans on “machineguns” remained valid, and suggested that
military style assault rifles like the M-16 were not protected arms. See id. For more
on how the lower courts have approached this question of what arms constitute
unprotected “dangerous and unusual” weapons, see Kopel & Greenlee, supra note
27, at 230-241.
49
For more analysis of the opinions in Heller, see generally, Rostron, supra
note 40; Griepsma, supra note 34.
50
Griepsma, supra note 34.
51
Heller, 554 U.S. at 628.
52
Id. at 628, n. 27.
53
Id.
46
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imminent wave of Second Amendment litigation “threaten[ed] to leave
cities without effective protection against gun violence.” 54
The Court did not clarify the standard of review question when it
revisited the Second Amendment two years later in McDonald v City
of Chicago. 55 The Court in McDonald embarked on a historical
inquiry to determine if the right to individual self-defense, which was
recognized in Heller as a “central component of the Second
Amendment,” was also so “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition” as to be part of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 56 A majority of Justices answered in the affirmative,
holding that the individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense
was one of the “fundamental rights necessary to our system of ordered
liberty.” 57 Therefore, the Second Amendment was incorporated and
applied against state and local government through the Fourteenth
Amendment. 58
The plurality opinion by Justice Samuel Alito restated many of the
same principles from Heller, including the recognition of
presumptively valid regulations such as longstanding prohibitions of
firearm possession by felons or the carrying of guns in “sensitive
places.” 59 However, the Court again did not fully elaborate the
contours of the Second Amendment’s protections. Instead, after
invalidating Chicago’s ban on handguns, Justice Alito signaled to
54

Id. at 718 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
As previously mentioned, McDonald involved a challenge to hand gun ban’s
in Chicago (and neighboring suburb of Oak Park, IL). See McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 748 (2010).
56
See Stephen Kiehl, In Search of a Standard: Gun Regulations After Heller
and McDonald, 70 MD. L. REV. 1131, 1141 (2011) (citing McDonald, 561 U.S. at
777.)
57
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 777.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 786. (“We made it clear in Heller that our holding did not cast doubt
on such longstanding regulatory measures as ‘prohibitions on the possession of
firearms by felons and the mentally ill,’ ‘laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.’ We repeat those
assurances here.”).
55
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states and local governments to continue to experiment with
“reasonable firearms regulation.” 60
The Court, however, offered no additional guidance on what
experiments in gun regulations might be “reasonable” and gave no
standard to lower courts as to how they were to review the
constitutionality of these state and local experiments in gun control. 61
Though the McDonald Court reaffirmed its rejection of any sort of a
judicial balancing inquiry, like that proposed by Justice Breyer in
Heller, 62 the Court declined to address what standards of review or
levels of scrutiny should guide lower courts going forward. 63
Justice Breyers’s dissent in Heller and Justice Stevens’s dissent in
McDonald both warned of the inevitable flood of litigation in the
lower courts, and the dangers of leaving no clear standards to guide
the decisions. Over time though, a majority of the Federal Circuit
Courts of Appeals would eventually develop and adopt their own
framework for analyzing the new wave of Second Amendment
challenges they encountered.
B. The Federal Courts React to the New Second Amendment
Regime: The Development of the Two-Step Means-End Test
Not surprisingly, in the initial few years following Heller and then
McDonald, there were hundreds of challenges to firearm regulations in
the lower courts. 64 As the Supreme Court had avoided describing the
full scope of the Second Amendment’s protections, some of the initial
lower court cases were concerned with the question of what other
“lawful” uses of firearms were protected by the Second Amendment

60

See Id. at 785.
Kiehl, supra note 56, at 1140-41.
62
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 785.
63
See Kiehl, supra note 56, at 1140-41.
64
Id. at 1141.
61

61
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besides the right to keep arms in the home for self-defense. 65 The
problem that arose early on in all these cases was what standard courts
should use to review regulations on firearm use when they allegedly
burdened conduct determined to be within the scope of the Second
Amendment. 66
In the initial years following the Supreme Court decisions, lower
courts used virtually the complete range of standards to evaluate gun
control measures, including varying levels of intermediate or strict
scrutiny (or a hybrid of both), a reasonableness test, and an undue
burden test similar to that applied in abortion cases. 67 Some courts
avoided setting any standard all together. 68 Regardless of the test used,
the gun control measures usually survived review. 69
Eventually, a guiding framework for analysis emerged in the form
of a two-part means-end test similar to that used in the First
Amendment context. 70 The test was first explicitly articulated by the
Third Circuit in United States v Marzzarella. 71 The first step of this
analysis is to determine whether the regulation at issue burdens
conduct that falls within the scope of the Second Amendment
protections. 72 If the conduct does not fall within the scope of the
Second Amendment or there is no burden, then the inquiry is complete
and the regulation withstands constitutional review. 73 If there is a
burden on protected conduct, the second step is to evaluate the

65

See e.g., Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1252
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (stating that the Second Amendment protects other lawful uses of
firearms like hunting); see generally, Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 27.
66
Kiehl, supra note 56, at 1141.
67
See id. at 1145-49 (describing cases).
68
Id.
69
Id. at 1141. (“[T]he only consistency in the lower court cases is in the
results. Regardless of the test used, challenged gun laws almost always survive.”)
(internal citation omitted).
70
See Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 27, at 212-14.
71
United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010).
72
Id.
73
Id.

62

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol13/iss1/3

12

: Between Scylla and Charybdis: <i>Ezell v. City of Chicago (Ezell

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 13

Fall 2017

regulation under some level of means-end scrutiny. 74 The burden of
proof is on the government throughout both steps. 75
As to the first step, Heller described only one clear area of
conduct that is at the core of the Second Amendment’s protection: the
right of law-abiding individuals to keep a firearm in the home for selfdefense. 76 For other forms of conduct that do not clearly fit in the
realm of home self-defense, the inquiry on whether the conduct is
covered by the Second Amendment is primarily a historical and textual
analysis modeled after the Heller decision itself. 77 The courts rely on a
“wide array of interpretative materials to conduct a historical analysis”
in order to determine if the “historical traditions” surrounding the
conduct at issue indicate it was considered protected activity. 78 In
practice, this step involves combing through a “variety of legal and
other sources to determine the public understanding of [the] legal text
in the period after its enactment or ratification.” 79
Drawing analogies to historical gun control measures is rife with
limitations, given the fundamental differences between the interests
involved with the use of firearms in the founding area compared to
gun violence concerns today. 80 This conflict between current and
74

Id.
Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 27, at 214.
76
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 88; see also Kopel & Greenlean, supra note 27, at
211 (“Heller leaves no doubt that self-defense is at the core of the right” under the
Second Amendment.).
77
See Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 27, at 229.
78
See NRA v. BATFE, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012).
79
Id. at 194 n.8. (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 605). Examples of these sources
include similar arms-baring protections in state constitutions or legislation;
commentaries by scholars and legislatures around the time of ratification; and 19th
century legislation limiting or burdening the same or analogous conduct as the
present law under review. See Id.
80
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 714-15 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the “self
defense” interests of the founding era were not comparable to the urban-crime
prevention interest of the present day, given that, to the founding era Americans
living on the frontier, self defense meant protection from “outbreaks of fighting with
Indian tribes, rebellions such as Shays' Rebellion, marauders, and crime-related
dangers to travelers on the roads, on footpaths, or along waterways.”).
75

63
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historical interests reflects the larger deficiency with using “original
public meaning” analysis to determine the current scope of a
constitutional right. 81 Placing these issues aside for now, for this
article’s purposes it is enough to say that under the two-step test
adopted by the lower courts, the first step requires that judges examine
all the historical evidence that the parties and the jurists themselves
can muster. The ultimate goal is to determine if the present restriction
on gun use or ownership under review “is consistent with a
longstanding tradition” of founding era and 19th century legislatures
restricting gun use or ownership in a comparable manner. 82
In terms of the second step and the proper level of means-end
scrutiny to apply, the Court in Heller only foreclosed the use of
rational basis review. 83 Therefore, the lower courts have almost
uniformly agreed that some level of heightened scrutiny applies. 84 The
courts select a level of scrutiny in a manner similar to the general First
81

For a general critique of originalsm and original public meaning analysis in
the context of Heller, see generally Morgan Cloud, A Conclusion in Search of a
History to Support It, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 29 (2010).
82
See BATFE, 700 F.3d at 194 (5th Cir. 2012) (concluding after an exhaustive
historical review that the challenged federal statute banning licenses dealers from
selling firearms to minors under 21 was “consistent with a longstanding tradition of
age– and safety-based restrictions on the ability to access arms,” which meant that
the ability of 18-20 year olds to purchase firearms “falls outside the Second
Amendment's protection.”). The BAFTE court indicated that they were “inclined” to
uphold the statute based on their historical analysis in step one, but they noted the
“institutional challenges” in reaching a definitive historical conclusion, and thus they
proceeded to analyze the statute under step two. Id. For more examples of the
historical inquiry of step one in practice, see, e.g., United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d
8, 16 (1st Cir. 2009) (upholding similar statute banning minors from possessing
firearms based on historical evidence); United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 519 520 (6th Cir. 2012) (upholding sentencing enhancements for using firearms in the
commission of a crime based on historical analysis).
83
Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27.
84
See Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 27, at 274 n. 486 (listing cases from
nearly every circuit agreeing that the use of rational basis is foreclosed and some
heightened level of scrutiny applies). According to Kopel & Greenlee, the sole
exception appears to be the Second Circuit, which requires a “substantial burden” on
protected conduct for the Court to apply more than rational basis review. Id.
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Amendment framework, where “the level of scrutiny applicable under
the Second Amendment . . .‘depends on the nature of the conduct
being regulated and the degree to which the challenged law burdens
the right.’” 85 Therefore, a law that imposes a “substantial burden”
upon the core rights protected by the Second Amendment, such as selfdefense in the home, needs to have a “strong justification” akin to
strict scrutiny. 86 A law that imposes a less substantial burden or that
implicates conduct that is not a core right, like self-defense in the
home but is more ancillary conduct such as registration requirements
or permit fees, should be “proportionately easier to justify.” 87
The way in which any individual panels describe the level of
scrutiny they are applying can vary widely from case to case and judge
to judge. 88 As a general principle, the highest level of scrutiny (strict
scrutiny) is typically reserved for those laws that threaten the core
Second Amendment rights of law abiding citizens to use a firearm in
the home for self-defense 89 or that restrict other activity that the
historical inquiry of the first step indicates was traditionally at the core
of the Second Amendment’s protections, such as hunting. 90 For
example, courts have applied strict scrutiny to lifetime bans on
handgun ownership for nonviolent misdemeanants 91 and a categorical
ban on persons buying guns from outside their home state. 92
85

Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1257 (citing United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673,
680 (4th Cir. 2010).
86
Id.
87
See id.
88
See Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 27, at 196.
89
See NRA v. BATFE, 700 F.3d 185, 195 (5th Cir. 2012) (“A regulation that
threatens a right at the core of the Second Amendment—for example, the right of a
law-abiding, responsible adult to possess and use a handgun to defend his or her
home and family—triggers strict scrutiny.”) (citing Heller 554 U.S. at 635).
90
See Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1252. For additional cases recognizing activities
like hunting and target practice as covered by the Second Amendment, see generally
Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 27, at 204-07.
91
Gowder v. City of Chicago, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1123 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
92
Mance v. Holder, 74 F. Supp. 3d 795, 804 (N.D. Tex. 2015); For more
examples, see generally Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 27, at 274-78.
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Conversely, for regulations shy of the total bans on gun ownership
found in Heller and McDonald that do not substantially burden the
core rights protected under the Second Amendment, but which still
implicate conduct within the scope of the Amendment’s protections,
the courts tend to apply a less heightened standard more akin to
intermediate scrutiny. 93 The overwhelming majority of lower court
decisions post-Heller involving the Second Amendment have applied
something akin to intermediate scrutiny, whereby the regulation must
be substantially related to an important government interest. 94
Many courts using this two-step framework draw comparisons to
the First Amendment framework for how they decide which level of
heightened scrutiny to apply. 95 For example, total bans on gun
ownership in the home could be seen as comparable to content-based
restrictions on speech, and thus subject to strict scrutiny. 96 Similarly,
93

See Kopel and Greenlee, supra note 27, at 314.
See e.g., Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1261–64 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (applying intermediate scrutiny to prohibition on possession of magazines
with a capacity of more than ten rounds of ammunition); United States v. Booker,
644 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2011) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a federal law
prohibiting the possession of firearms by a person convicted of a misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1538, 182 L.Ed.2d 175 (2012); United
States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to a federal regulation which prohibits “carrying or possessing a loaded
weapon in a motor vehicle” within national park areas), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 756,
181 L.Ed.2d 482 (2011); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir.
2010) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a federal law which prohibits the possession
of firearms with obliterated serial numbers), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 958, 178 L.Ed.2d
790 (2011); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 802 (10th Cir. 2010) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to a federal law which prohibits the possession of firearms
while subject to a domestic protection order), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 2476, 179
L.Ed.2d 1214 (2011); Fyock v. Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991, 998 (9th Cir. 2015) (ban on
magazines holding more than ten rounds is valid under intermediate scrutiny).
95
See e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 2010).
96
Cf. Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 968 (9th Cir.
2014) (San Francisco ordinances regulating firearm storage in the home were
distinguishable from the total bans on handgun possession invalidated in Heller, and
were “akin to a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction,” thus they only
needed to survive intermediate scrutiny).
94
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content-neutral regulations that only restrict the “time, place, and
manner” by which the Second Amendment rights can be exercised, for
example by regulating how firearms are stored when not in use, should
be subjected only to intermediate scrutiny as in the speech context. 97
Furthermore, at least one court has argued that intermediate scrutiny
makes particular sense and is preferred in the Second Amendment
context because of the unique public safety risk of the activity being
regulated—firearm use—which sets it apart from other fundamental
rights which are typically evaluated under strict scrutiny. 98
Thus, the consensus that has emerged in the courts appears to be a
for applying a form of intermediate scrutiny in the majority of cases
involving the Second Amendment, and reserving strict scrutiny for
those cases that substantially burden the core right of self defense in
the home, or other conduct that historical inquiry reveals is a core right
of the Second Amendment. 99
The Seventh Circuit’s approach, however, has not been
entirely in line with this majority view. Several of the Seventh
Circuit’s early post-Heller and McDonald decisions attempted to avoid
any discussion of a set standard of review or level of scrutiny.
Furthermore, while the courts in Ezell I and Ezell II purported to adopt
and apply the same two-step framework as used in a majority of

97

Id.
Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 1486 (2016) (“The risk inherent in firearms and other weapons
distinguishes the Second Amendment right from other fundamental rights that have
been held to be evaluated under a strict scrutiny test, such as the right to marry and
the right to be free from viewpoint discrimination, which can be exercised without
creating a direct risk to others. Intermediate scrutiny appropriately places the burden
on the government to justify its restrictions, while also giving governments
considerable flexibility to regulate gun safety.”).
99
See Griepsma, supra note 34, at 296 (arguing intermediate scrutiny appears
to be the most common level of scrutiny used in Second Amendment cases). See
generally Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 27 (collecting cases, the majority of which
apply something akin to intermediate scrutiny).
98
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circuits, 100 in both those cases the test was improperly applied to strike
down gun control measures.
II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH
The en banc Seventh Circuit has only granted review of a Second
Amendment challenge on one occasion, and it was in the relatively
immediate aftermath of Heller and McDonald in 2010. 101 The en banc
court, in an opinion authored by then Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook,
held a federal statute that banned firearm possession by individuals
convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence was
permissible under the Second Amendment. 102 The court noted the
language from Heller on presumptively valid regulations—like bans
on felons possessing guns—as evidence that some categorical bans on
firearm ownership could be constitutional. 103 But, Judge Easterbrook’s
opinion strongly cautioned the lower courts against reading too much
into the language of Heller beyond its principle holding conferring an
individual right, one part of which was to keep a firearm in the home
for self defense. 104 While the Skoien court declined to delve too
“deeply into the ‘levels of scrutiny’ quagmire,” it did agree that some
form of “strong showing” was necessary and indicated that the law
would pass intermediate scrutiny review. 105
100

Ezell v. City of Chicago, 846 F.3d 888, 893 (7th Cir. 2017) (“We note for
good measure that most other circuits have adopted the framework articulated
in Ezell I”).
101
See United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010).
102
See id. at 640-42.
103
Id. at 640.
104
Id. (“We do not think it profitable to parse these passages of Heller as if
they contained an answer to the question whether § 922(g)(9) is valid. They are
precautionary language. . . . What other entitlements the Second Amendment creates,
and what regulations legislatures may establish, were left open. The opinion is not a
comprehensive code; it is just an explanation for the Court's disposition. Judicial
opinions must not be confused with statutes, and general expressions must be read in
light of the subject under consideration.”)
105
Id. at 642 (The government conceded the regulation was only valid
“if substantially related to an important governmental objective” and the court stated
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Though it is not the explicit framework in the opinion, the
analysis in Skoien can be viewed as roughly in line with the two-step
means-end test. 106 The court recognized that misdemeanants with
domestic violence convictions were not totally excluded from Second
Amendment protection (step one) and indicated the statute would pass
intermediate scrutiny (step two). 107 Not long after Skoien, the threejudge panel in Ezell I (2011) formally adopted the same two-step
framework now used by the majority of other circuits. Ezell I is
discussed in more detail below as important background for Ezell II.
A. Too Clever by Half: Ezell I and Chicago’s First Attempt at
Post-McDonald Gun Regulation
Ezell I is worth examining in some detail as it is not only the first
round of litigation for the case that is the primary subject of this
article, but it also is critically important to the Seventh Circuit’s
Second Amendment jurisprudence in how the majority adopted and
described the two-step test. Furthermore, the manner in which the
majority in Ezell I inappropriately applied the two-step framework
was significant in constraining the constitutional path forward for gun
control advocates seeking to curtail gun violence in Chicago.
After the Supreme Court declared Chicago’s ban on handgun
ownership unconstitutional in McDonald, the City Council organized
hearings to determine what steps they could take to continue to combat
gun violence in the city. 108 Just four days after the decision in
McDonald, and after testimony from a range of academics, experts,
that “no one doubts that the goal of § 922(g)(9), preventing armed mayhem, is an
important governmental objective. Both logic and data establish a substantial relation
between § 922(g)(9) and this objective.”).
106
See Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 27, at 242. The Seventh Circuit had also
applied what appeared to be a form of the two-step test in the panel decision in
United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2009), which was later vacated when
the case was reheard en banc, and again in United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685,
691 (7th Cir. 2010), which followed the logic of the en banc Skoien decision to
uphold the federal ban on convicted felons possessing firearms. Id.
107
Id.
108
Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2011).
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and community activists, the City Council passed the Responsible Gun
Owners Ordinance (the “Ordinance”). 109 The Ordinance contained a
sweeping array of gun control measures and restrictions including:
bans on certain types of weapons, ammunition and accessories;
forbidding the sale or transfer of weapons except in limited
circumstances; and a complex permitting regime. 110 Inevitably, the
Ordinance was challenged in a flood of new litigation by gun owners,
retailers, and rights activists. 111
Ezell I specifically involved provisions of the Ordinance that
banned all live firing-ranges within the city limits. 112 The range ban on
its own would perhaps already be suspect, but another part of the
Ordinance conditioned firearm permits on the completion of a state
certified firearm safety course with a mandated requirement of onehour of range-training. 113 Thus, as a practical matter, no individual
could satisfy their Chicago permit requirements within the city
limits.114
A group of gun owners, activists, and a prospective firing
range operator brought suit against the city seeking a restraining order
and injunction against enforcement of the firing-range ban. 115 The
plaintiffs argued that the Ordnance burdened their Second Amendment
right to keep a firearm in the home for self-defense—because live
training was required for a permit—as well as their right to maintain
proficiency in firearm use which they claimed was also protected by
109

Id.
See Id. at 690-91. The full Ordinance is available at
https://www.ispfsb.com/Public/Firearms/Ordinances/chicago.pdf.
111
See e.g., Illinois Ass'n of Firearms Retailers v. City of Chicago, 961 F.
Supp. 2d 928, 931 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (ordinance banning nearly all sale and transfer of
arms); Second Amendment Arms v. City of Chicago, 135 F. Supp. 3d 743, 747
(N.D. Ill. 2015) (zoning requirements for gun stores and ban on displaying their
firearms in windows, as well as a permit fee requirement).
112
Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 690-91(CHI. MUN.CODE § 8–20–280 prohibited all
“[s]hooting galleries, firearm ranges, or any other place where firearms are
discharged”)
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id
110
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the Second Amendment. 116 After a hearing and some limited
testimony, the District Court denied both the plaintiffs’ motions for a
temporary restraining order and for a preliminary injunction. 117
The Court of Appeals, in a unanimous judgment, reversed the
district court and remanded with instructions for the district court to
issue a preliminary injunction against the firing range ban. 118 Judge
Diane Sykes, who notably had dissented from the en banc decision in
Skoien, wrote the majority opinion which was joined by Judge
Michael Kanne. 119 Judge Ilana Rovner concurred in the judgment but
filed a separate opinion. 120 Judge Sykes described the primary issue
before the court as whether the firing range ban violated the Second
Amendment on its face, and whether the ability to maintain
proficiency in firearm use through live range training fell within the
scope of the Second Amendment. 121
To answer this question, Judge Sykes utilized the framework of
the two-step means-end test discussed supra, which at the time was
already starting to be utilized in several other circuits. 122 Judge Sykes
described the first step of the analysis as “a textual and historical
inquiry into original meaning” to determine if the conduct fell within
the scope of the Second Amendment right as it was publicly
116

Id.
See generally Ezell v. City of Chicago, No. 10 C 5135, 2010 WL 3998104,
at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2010).
118
Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 703.
119
Id. at 689.
120
Id. at 711.
121
Id. at 697-98. The court also addressed the preliminary issues of standing,
and the district court’s improper conclusion that the ability of the plaintiffs to leave
the city limits for firearm training meant that the second Amendment was not
implicated at all. Id. Rather, the court noted the general rule that the ability to
exercise a constitutional right someplace else does not mean the right is not
infringed, and because this was a facial challenge to a law and involved a burden on
a constitutional right, irreparable harm was presumed and the inquiry needed to
move to the likelihood of success on the merits.
122
Id. at 703 (noting the Third, Fourth, and Tenth Circuit had recently adopted
the framework).
117
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understood at the time of ratification. 123 Judge Sykes described the
second step as an inquiry into “the strength of the government’s
justification for regulating or restricting” the exercise of that right. 124
Similar to the second step in the other circuits, this involves applying
some heightened level of “mean-end scrutiny” to the law. 125
In this case, the majority answered the first inquiry by holding
that the core right to possess firearms for self defense also “implies a
corresponding right to acquire and maintain proficiency in their
use.” 126 The City attempted to point to a number of founding era,
antebellum and Reconstruction laws that limited the discharge of
firearms in public urban environments as evidence that the original
public meaning of the Second and Fourteenth Amendment did not
include a right to live firing-range training. 127 The majority dismissed
these statutes as unpersuasive, claiming that most were restrictions on
the “time, place, and manner” that firearms could be discharged and
were not as severe as the City’s total ban on firing ranges. 128 As the
majority concluded the City failed to meet its burden in showing that
live firearm training was “wholly outside the Second Amendment,” the
analysis needed to proceed to step two. 129
Similar to the court in Marzzarella, Judge Sykes next looked to
First Amendment doctrine for guidance on the level of scrutiny to
123

Id. at 700. The relevant time period depends on whether the law at issue is
federal or state/local action. See id. (“Heller suggests that some federal gun laws will
survive Second Amendment challenge because they regulate activity falling outside
the terms of the right as publicly understood when the Bill of Rights was
ratified; McDonald confirms that if the claim concerns a state or local law, the
“scope” question asks how the right was publicly understood when the Fourteenth
Amendment was proposed and ratified.”)
124
Id. at 703.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 705.
128
Id. The city did offer some evidence of historical regulations that totally
banned the discharge of firearms in city limits, but the majority distinguished those
regulations as focused on “fire suppression” and not relevant to Chicago’s offered
justifications for theft prevention and injury from stray bullets. Id.
129
Id. at 706.
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chose, and the appropriate circumstances for applying intermediate or
strict scrutiny. 130 Setting the “labels aside,” however, Judge Sykes
extrapolated from the First Amendment doctrine to a “sliding scale”
test for Second Amendment claims, whereby the general principles of
review are:
First, a severe burden on the core Second Amendment right
of armed self-defense will require an extremely strong publicinterest justification and a close fit between the government's
means and its end. Second, laws restricting activity lying
closer to the margins of the Second Amendment right, laws
that merely regulate rather than restrict, and modest burdens
on the right may be more easily justified. How much more
easily depends on the relative severity of the burden and its
proximity to the core of the right. 131
Judge Sykes’ formulation of the second step is generally similar to
that developed in the other circuits at the time, 132 but her mention of
setting aside the labels of strict and intermediate scrutiny is significant.
The other circuits to adopt the two-step test at the time had typically
described the choice of what level of scrutiny at the second step of the
analysis in more binary terms as a choice between strict and
intermediate scrutiny. 133 Judge Sykes opinion later demonstrates that
the application of this sliding-scale scrutiny as she has described it
allows for even more flexibility for judges to tilt the scale in how they
characterize the nature of the right and the appropriate level of

130

Id. 706-708.
Id. at 708.
132
See, e.g., United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010) (“the
level of scrutiny we apply depends on the nature of the conduct being regulated and
the degree to which the challenged law burdens the right”).
133
See e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 2010)
(choosing between strict and intermediate scrutiny); United States v. Chester, 628
F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010) (same).
131
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scrutiny. Furthermore, setting aside labels can obscure just exactly
what level of review a judge is applying. 134
In terms of the appropriate level of scrutiny for the City’s
ordinance banning firing ranges, Judge Sykes contrasted the case with
the factual circumstances of Skoien where the court had required a
“strong showing” akin to intermediate scrutiny. 135 In Skoien,
intermediate scrutiny was appropriate because the ban on domestic
violent misdemeanants did not impact the rights of “law-abiding,
responsible citizens,” 136 nor, according to Judge Sykes, did it implicate
the central right of self defense. 137 Here, the the firearm ban prevented
“law-abiding citizens” from engaging in target practice, which,
according to Judge Sykes, was a “serious encroachment on the right to
maintain proficiency in firearm use, an important corollary to the
meaningful exercise of the core right to possess firearms for selfdefense.” 138 Also of note was that a firearm permit in Chicago required
live range training. 139 Taken together, this necessitated “a more
rigorous standard than was applied in Skoien,” or what Judge Sykes
described as “not quite ‘strict scrutiny.’” 140 This standard required the
city “establish a close fit between the range ban and the actual public
interests it serves, and also that the public's interests are strong enough
to justify so substantial an encumbrance on individual Second
Amendment rights.” 141
The court held that the city did not come close to meeting this
burden, stating that the record contained no data or expert opinion but
only mere speculation on the public health risks due to stray bullets
134

As is discussed further infra, Ezell I and Ezell II are themselves prime
examples of this, as the majority describes the standard of review in different ways
in each case, despite it supposedly being the same.
135
Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 708.
136
Id. at 708 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 634).
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 708-709.
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and more guns susceptible to theft. 142 Interestingly, Judge Sykes noted
that the concerns of the city on the record could be “addressed through
sensible zoning and other appropriately tailored regulations,” 143 which
is of note considering her later opinion in Ezell II discussed below.
Because the range ban was “wholly out of proportion” to the public
interests the city purported to serve, the court concluded that the
plaintiffs had a strong likelihood of success on the merits and ordered
the issuance of a preliminary injunction. 144
Judge Rover wrote a concurrence in which she agreed with
the ultimate judgment insofar that the firing range ban was an
unconstitutional burden on the core right of self-defense identified in
Heller because the practical effect was that law abiding citizens would
not be able to obtain a permit for a gun even if the sole purpose was
self-defense in the home. 145 Judge Rovner also did seem to agree that
the right to use a firearm for self-defense in the home implied some
protected right to train to use guns safely, 146 but she pointed out that
did not necessarily imply a right to live firearm training, as there were
other options like classroom and simulated training. 147 Regardless,
142

Id.
Id. at 709.
144
Id. In addition to the range ban itself, the court order injunctions for a range
of other ordinances prohibiting the carrying of guns in public and the permit
requirement, in so far as they prohibited individuals from exercising their right to
range training. See id.
145
See Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 711 (Rovner, J. concurring) (“The regulation is two
clever by half…That residents may travel outside the jurisdiction to fulfill the
training requirement is irrelevant to the validity of the ordinance inside the City. In
this I agree with the majority . . . the City may not condition gun ownership for selfdefense in the home on a prerequisite that the City renders impossible to fulfill
within the City limits.”).
146
Id. at 712 (“the right to use a firearm in the home for self-defense would be
seriously impaired if gun owners were prevented from obtaining the training
necessary to use their weapons safely for that purpose”).
147
Id. (“There is no ban on classroom training. There is no ban on training
with a simulator and several realistic simulators are commercially available,
complete with guns that mimic the recoil of firearms discharging live ammunition.”)
(citing to examples of simulation systems).
143
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Judge Rovner concluded that the limited evidence on the record
supporting the City’s public safety justifications, and the fact that the
Ordinance was a complete ban on the training necessary to obtain a
permit, meant that the range ban was “unlikely to withstand scrutiny
under any standard of review.” 148
However, this conclusion was the end of Judge Rovner’s
agreement with the majority, and her concurrence was highly critical
of the manner in which Judge Sykes applied the two-step analysis,
specifically the level of scrutiny the majority applied. 149 Despite Judge
Sykes eschewing labels, Judge Rover recognized the standard applied
by the majority as “akin to strict scrutiny,” which she argued was
“more stringent [a standard] than is justified by the text or the history
of the Second Amendment.” 150 Judge Rover noted that the range ban
was not a complete ban on conduct “implicating the core of the
Second Amendment,” but rather the ban should be characterized as a
“a regulation in training, an area ancillary to a core right.” 151 Because
the “right to maintain proficiency in firearms handling is not the same
as the right to practice at a live gun range,” Judge Rovner could not
agree that a more rigorous standard than the intermediate scrutiny that
was applied in Skoien was necessary. 152
Additionally, Judge Rovner noted that the historical evidence of
regulations offered by the City was proof that intermediate scrutiny
was the more appropriate standard. 153 Despite the majority’s attempt to
distinguish the ban on live training from the historical regulations,
Judge Rovner argued that the Ordinance fell into the same category of
many of the historical laws which regulated the “time, place and
manner of gun discharges.” 154 Just as some of the historical examples
of regulations were focused on only the time of day or location that
148

Id.
See id. at 713.
150
Id.
151
Id. (emphasis added).
152
Id.
153
See id.
154
Id.
149
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firearms could be discharged, 155 the live firing range ban was just a
restriction on one “aspect of firearms training,” i.e. a restriction on one
manner of training (live as opposed to simulated) and on the place
(within the city limits). 156 Given these similarities, the “intermediate
scrutiny applied to time, place and manner restrictions” in the First
Amendment context would have been “both adequate and appropriate”
in this Second Amendment case. 157
Furthermore, the manner in which the majority summarily
dismissed the City’s offered public safety justification as “entirely
speculative” was, in Judge Rovner’s words, “naïve” and
“unfounded.” 158 Judge Rovner argued that the historical examples of
gun regulation offered by the city showed that “public safety was a
paramount value to our ancestors,” 159 and that public safety concerns
sometimes “trumped the Second Amendment right to discharge a
firearm in a particular place.” 160 Though the nature of the public safety
concern may have changed from the founding area to now, the
“historical context” nonetheless should have been proof for the
majority that “cities may take public safety into account in setting
reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on the discharge of
firearms within City limits.” 161 Given the unique “inherently
dangerous” nature of guns, Judge Rovner argued that Chicago “has a
right to impose reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on the
operation of live ranges in the interest of public safety and other
legitimate governmental concerns.” 162 Viewing the regulations as a
155

Id. (“as the majority itself points out, one statute prohibited the discharge of
firearms before sunrise, after sunset, or within one quarter mile of the nearest
building. Others prohibited firearms discharge without specific permissions and only
then at specific locations”).
156
Id. at 714.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id. at 714-15.
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“time, place and manner” restriction, the appropriate means of analysis
should have been intermediate scrutiny. 163
While Judge Rovner may have agreed that the City could not
even meet this level of scrutiny, based on the lack of evidence on the
record and the ban effectively making it impossible to achieve a
permit in the city limits, 164 her concurrence in Ezell I is incredibly
important to the future of Second Amendment analysis in the Seventh
Circuit. Judge Rovner was operating in the same two-step framework
as the majority, by looking at the historical evidence for the scope of
the Second Amendment right and choosing the appropriate level of
scrutiny based on the nature of that right and how it was being
regulated. Doing this analysis led her to appropriately conclude
intermediate scrutiny as the standard of review based on the nature of
the ban as a time, place, and manner restriction. 165 This approach is in
line with how other circuits have applied the two-step analysis and
likewise applied intermediate scrutiny for time, place, and manner
style gun restrictions, or when the activity at issue is an ancillary right
and not a core Second Amendment right. 166 Judge Rovner’s
concurrence in Ezell I in other words is an early post-Heller example
of faithful application of the two-step analysis to gun regulation under
the Second Amendment.
Conversely, Judges Sykes majority opinion, while it was pivotal
in laying the foundation and formally adopting the two-step Second
Amendment analysis for the Seventh Circuit, 167 is an example in how
163

Id. at 714.
Id. at 712.
165
Id. at 714.
166
See e.g., cases cited supra, note 94.
167
For examples of cases since Ezell I applying the two-Step test, see Horsley
v. Trame, 808 F.3d 1126, 1132 (7th Cir. 2015) (applying test to parent signature
requirement for minors under 21 to get FOIA card); Justice v. Town of Cicero, Ill.,
827 F. Supp. 2d 835, 844 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (applying test to township ordinances
requiring firearm registration and fees); Southerland v. Escapa, 176 F. Supp. 3d 786,
789 (C.D. Ill. 2016) (applying two-step test to state ban on public carrying of long
guns and rifles).
164
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the test leaves perhaps too much room for individual judges to place a
finger on the sliding scale. It is ironic that Judge Sykes, who touted the
“original public meaning” historical analysis in Heller, was so quick to
dismiss the substantial historical evidence offered by the City as
irrelevant and unpersuasive. 168 This irony perhaps can serve as a larger
indictment on this form of original public meaning analysis because
judges without formal training as historians can come to widely
different views on what conclusions to draw from history; indeed, just
as Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens did in Heller. 169 However, this is
beyond the scope of this article. Regardless, if nothing else it was an
inappropriate application of the historical inquiry aspect of the twostep test for Judge Sykes to so quickly reject the historical corollaries
between the City’s firing range regulation and past “time, place,
manner” restrictions. Judge Sykes instead characterized the right of
live fire arm training as one “implicating the core of the Second
Amendment” without much historical justification of her own for that
conclusion. 170 Characterizing the right in this way allowed Judge
Sykes to apply “something akin to strict scrutiny,” despite her own
claim it was “not quite strict scrutiny.” 171
Regardless of the label, the regulation appeared subject to a level
of scrutiny that few gun control measures could survive, and certainly
higher than the intermediate scrutiny that would have been appropriate
for such a “time, place, and manner” measure. While the regulation in
Ezell I would have likely failed any level of scrutiny, setting the
precedent of essentially strict scrutiny, which is binding on the lower
courts, can have far-reaching implications for future gun control
regulations. 172 The decision also set a narrow path forward for
168

Ezell I, 651 F. 3d at 711 (Rovner concurring) (“Given the majority's nod to
the relevance of historical regulation, curt dismissal of actual regulations of firearms
discharges in urban areas is inappropriate.”).
169
See generally, Cloud, supra note 11; D.C v. Heller, 554. U.S. 570 (2008).
170
Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 711 (Rovner, concurring).
171
Id.
172
See, e.g., Tony Kole And Ghost Industries, LLC, Plaintiffs, v. Village Of
Norridge, Defendant., No. 11 C 3871, 2017 WL 5128989, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 6,
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Chicago to enact replacement gun control measures, which, as we will
see in Ezell II, it was unable to navigate.
B. Variations on the Two-Step: Other Notable Post Ezell I Cases
in the Seventh Circuit
After the Court in Ezell I adopted the two-step framework in
2011, the test became the general standard for the Seventh Circuit in
Second Amendment challenges going forward. 173 However, the en
banc Seventh Circuit has notably not addressed the two-step
framework adopted in Ezell I, nor has it revisited the Second
Amendment at all since Skoien, though it came very close in Moore v.
Madigan. 174
The panel decision in Moore was significant in that it found two
Illinois statutes categorically banning the carrying of guns in public
unconstitutional. 175 Rather than explicitly apply the two-step
framework adopted in Ezell I, Judge Richard Poser in his majority
opinion instead concluded that the text and the history of the Second
Amendment implied that the right to “keep and bear arms” for selfdefense was not limited to the home but extended to the right to carry
a gun for self-defense in public. 176 The court held that Illinois had
2017) (applying the same “not quite strict scrutiny” to village ordinances restricting
firearms dealers.).
173
See, e.g., Southerland v. Escapa, 176 F. Supp. 3d 786, 789 (C.D. Ill. 2016)
(acknowledging that “the Seventh Circuit has provided a two-step analysis in
evaluating the constitutionality of statutes under the Second Amendment”) (citing to
Ezell I, at 701).
174
Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012). A petition for a rehearing
en banc was denied, though four of the ten active judges reviewing the petition
would have granted the rehearing and seemed to indicate the panel decision should
be overturned. See generally Moore v. Madigan, 708 F.3d 901, 902 (7th Cir. 2013)
(Hamilton, J., dissenting, joined by, Rovner, Williams, & Wood, JJ.).
175
Moore, 702 F.3d at 933 (The laws at issue had exceptions for police officers
and security personal, as well as certain exclusions for carrying a gun on one’s own
property, but otherwise prohibited the carrying of any “ready to use” gun outside.).
176
See id. (“The Supreme Court has decided that the amendment confers a
right to bear arms for self-defense, which is as important outside the home as
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failed to offer “more than merely a rational basis for believing that its
uniquely sweeping ban [was] justified by an increase in public safety,”
thus the laws could not withstand constitutional scrutiny. 177
Where the majority in Moore did not seem to explicitly utilize the
two-step means-end test in striking down the state-wide gun control
law, the majority in Friedman v. City of Highland Park, Illinois
similarly used its own unique analysis in upholding a ban on certain
semi-automatic assault weapons and high capacity magazines. 178 In
his opinion for the majority, Judge Easterbrook developed a three-part
test that looked at: (1) whether the arms being banned were common at
the time of the Second Amendments ratification; or alternately (2)
whether the type of arm had a “reasonable relationship” to militia
service; and finally (3) the availability of other unrestricted firearms to
be used for self-defense. 179
Both Friedman and Moore appear to be outliers in the Seventh
Circuit’s jurisprudence on the Second Amendment in terms of their
analytical approach, though interestingly they reached opposite
conclusions regarding the ultimate constitutionality of the gun
regulations. 180 Moore in particular was a major set-back for gun
inside. The theoretical and empirical evidence (which overall is inconclusive) is
consistent with concluding that a right to carry firearms in public may promote selfdefense.”).
177
Id. at 941. Illinois subsequently drafted new licensing and registration
legislation to replace the outright ban on carrying a weapon in public. These
requirements have subsequently been upheld as constitutional. See Berron v. Illinois
Concealed Carry Licensing Review Bd., 825 F.3d 843, 847 (7th Cir. 2016), cert.
denied, 137 S. Ct. 843(2017).
178
784 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Friedman v. City of
Highland Park, Ill., 136 S. Ct. 447(2015)
179
Id. (“[I]nstead of trying to decide what ‘level’ of scrutiny applies, and how
it works, inquiries that do not resolve any concrete dispute, we think it better to ask
whether a regulation bans weapons that were common at the time of ratification or
those that have ‘some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a
well regulated militia’ . . . and whether law-abiding citizens retain adequate means
of self-defense.”).
180
See cases supra note 167; see also Kopel & Greenlee, supra note 27, at
209-211 (criticizing Judge Easterbrook’s approach in Freidman). Freidman in
particular is also notable because in the denial of cert, Justice Clarence Thomas filed
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control advocates, but the court did leave the door open for a wide
range of more nuanced legislation than the invalidated blanket bans. 181
Indeed, the new state-wide licensing requirements for carrying guns in
public that replaced the outright ban have been upheld. 182
Apart from these notable outliers, most decisions in the Seventh
Circuit since Ezell I have applied the two-step framework the majority
adopted. 183
III. EZELL II – CHICAGO TAKES ANOTHER SHOT AT REGULATION OF
FIRING RANGES
The decision in Ezell I is critically important not just in relation to
the application of the two-step analysis in the Seventh Circuit, but
because its holding required that Chicago had to find a new approach
to regulate live firing-ranges in the city. The new approach the City
adopted became the subject of Ezell II.
Chicago responded to the decision in Ezell I by promulgating
a large variety of new regulations concerning firing ranges, including
“zoning restrictions, licensing and operating rules, construction
standards, and environmental requirements.” 184 The same plaintiffs
from Ezell I returned to court to argue that the new regulations also

a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Alito arguing the court should have taken the
case. Justice Thomas argued that the lower courts across the country had been
incorrectly applying the decisions in Heller and McDonald, and the Supreme Court
needed to intervene. See Friedman v. City of Highland Park, Ill., 136 S. Ct. 447
(2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
181
See Moore v. Madigan, 708 F.3d 901, 902 (7th Cir. 2013) (Hamilton, J.,
dissenting in denial of re-hearing en banc). Judge Hamilton also encouraged district
court judges to develop a full record so courts could appropriately way the state
interests and the burdens in each case. Id.
182
See Berron v. Illinois Concealed Carry Licensing Review Bd., 825 F.3d
843, 847 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 843, 197 L. Ed. 2d 69 (2017).
183
See, e.g., cases cited supra, note 167.
184
Ezell v. City of Chicago, 846 F.3d 888, 891 (7th Cir. 2017) (firing ranges
operated by law enforcement and private security firms were exempt from the
regulations).
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violated the Second Amendment. 185 After cross-motions for summary
judgment at the district court level, the trial judge issued a ruling
invalidating some ordinances while upholding many others, which
both sides appealed. 186 Only three of the ordinances remained at issue
on appeal: (1) a zoning requirement that permitted ranges only in
“manufacturing districts”; (2) a distancing requirement that barred any
firing range within 100 feet of other ranges or within 500 feet of any
district zoned for residential use, as well as within 500 feet from any
“preexisting school, day-care facility, place of worship, liquor retailer,
children's activities facility, library, museum, or hospital”; and (3) a
regulation prohibiting anyone under the age of 18 from entering a
shooting range. 187 The district court had invalidated the manufacturing
district zoning requirement, finding the City had failed to provide
enough evidence to support “more than merely a rational basis” for the
necessity of placing firing ranges exclusively in manufacturing
districts. 188 However, the court had upheld the distancing requirements
based on Heller’s language supporting “longstanding prohibitions on
the carrying of firearms in sensitive places,” and the ban on minors
largely because “minors are not guaranteed Second Amendment
Rights.” 189
Judge Sykes, again writing for the majority and joined by
Judge Kanne, affirmed the lower court in holding the manufacturing
district requirement unconstitutional, but reversed regarding the other
two regulations, finding that the distancing requirements and the ban
185

Those plaintiffs being individual gun owners, gun rights originations, and a
company seeking to build firing ranges. See id.
186
Id.
187
Id at 89. The unchallenged rulings involved ordnances setting construction
standards, requiring range masters be present, and that all firing range employees
had FOID cards, which were all upheld, and limits on firing range hours of operation
which were declared unconstitutional. See generally, Ezell v. City of Chicago, 70 F.
Supp. 3d 871, 875 (N.D. Ill. 2014), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 846 F.3d 888 (7th Cir.
2017)
188
Ezell v. City of Chicago, 70 F. Supp. 3d 871, 884 (N.D. Ill. 2014), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 846 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2017).
189
Id. at 889.
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on minors in ranges also were unconstitutional. 190 Judge Rovner
concurred in the judgment regarding the manufacturing district
requirement and the total ban on minors entering firing ranges, but she
dissented from the decision regarding the distancing requirements. 191
A. The Next Round of Ordinances Meets the Next Application of
the Two-Step Test from Ezell I
Judge Sykes began her majority opinion in Ezell II by restating
the key principals of the two-step analysis established in her opinion in
Ezell I, where “resolving Second Amendment cases usually entails two
inquiries. The threshold question is whether the regulated activity falls
within the scope of the Second Amendment . . . then there must be a
second inquiry into the strength of the government’s justification for
restricting or regulating the exercise of Second Amendment rights.” 192
Again, the first step is a “textual and historical” inquiry to determine
whether the regulated conduct falls within the scope of the Second
Amendment, and the second step is a sliding scale “means-end” test
where the regulation is examined under a “heightened standard of
scrutiny,” the precise level of which depends on “how close the law
comes to the core of the Second Amendment right and the severity of
the law’s burden on the right.” 193 Judge Sykes further noted that, by
the time of Ezell II, the majority of other circuits had now adopted the
same or similar two-step framework. 194

190
191

Ezell II, 846 F.3d at 890.
See generally, id. at 898-907 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting

in part).
192

Id. at 892 (majority opinion).
Id.
194
See id. at 893; see generally, Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff's Dep’t, 775
F.3d 308, 326 (6th Cir. 2014) (en banc); Jackson v. City & County of San Francisco,
746 F.3d 953, 961 (9th Cir. 2014); Nat'l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012); Heller
v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011); United States v.
Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792,
193
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In terms of the threshold scope question, the same holding
and analysis from Ezell I was applied in the current case: that the
Second Amendment “individual right of armed defense . . . includes a
corresponding right to acquire and maintain proficiency in firearm use
through target practice at a range.” 195 Interestingly, when describing
how the court had applied step two of the framework in Ezell I, Judge
Sykes stated that the court “applied a strong form of intermediate
scrutiny.” 196 What was once “not quite strict scrutiny” before was now
a “strong form of intermediate scrutiny.” 197 Whatever the level of
scrutiny, the majority did not elaborate further on what specific form
of scrutiny it was applying to the regulations at issue in Ezell II. 198
Rather, Judge Sykes focused on the language from the sliding-scale
test in Ezell I, which requires that the City demonstrate “a close fit
between the range ban and the actual public interests it serves, and
also that the public's interests are strong enough to justify so
substantial an encumbrance on individual Second Amendment
rights.” 199 In order to establish this “close fit” between the challenged
regulations and the “actual public benefits they serve,” the majority
agreed with the lower court in finding that the City needed to do so
with “actual evidence, not just assertions.” 200
Judge Sykes proceeded to examine this evidence and analyze
whether there was such a close fit. 201 In doing so, Judge Sykes argued
that the critical failure of the lower court’s approach was analyzing the
zoning and distancing requirements separately, stating instead that
they “stand or fall together,” and that they are “a single regulatory
800–01 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir.
2010).
195
Id. at 892-93 (restating that “[r]ange training is not categorically outside the
Second Amendment. To the contrary, it lies close to the core of the individual right
of armed defense.”).
196
Id. at 893.
197
See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d, 708 (7th Cir. 2011).
198
Ezell II, 846 F.3d at 893.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 894.
201
Id.
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package for purposes of Second Amendment Scrutiny. 202 Furthermore,
Judge Sykes disagreed with the lower courts understanding of the
Heller language on prohibitions of carrying firearms in “sensitive
places.” 203 While declining to resolve the question of the presumptive
validity of those categories of “longstanding prohibitions,” Judge
Sykes indicated that the distancing requirement did not fall into any of
those categories, because it dealt with firing ranges and not the
carrying of firearms themselves. 204 In addition, Judge Sykes argued
that the distancing requirement from residential districts implied that
the City was suggesting that firearms “are categorically incompatible
with residential areas,” which she stated was “flatty inconsistent with
Heller, which was explicit that firearm possession in the home for selfdefense is the core of the Second Amendment.” 205
Judge Sykes’s opinion next examined the city’s evidence that
the zoning and distance requirements together supported their offered
public safety interests, specifically that “firing ranges attract gun
thieves, cause airborne lead contamination, and carry a risk of fire.” 206
On this score, the City was severely lacking in evidence, having
presented no empirical data that the mere presence of a firing range
would increase the risk of theft or crime, or that distancing firing
ranges from schools and residences had a connection to reducing these
risks. 207 The City’s own expert witnesses also had testified to the lack
of empirical support for the connection between the regulations and
202

Id. Judge Sykes elaborated by arguing that: “The two zoning requirements
work in tandem to limit where shooting ranges may locate. The impact of the
distancing rule cannot be measured “standing alone,” as the district judge thought; to
meaningfully evaluate the effect of the buffer-zone requirement, we need to know
which zoning districts are open to firing ranges.” Id.
203
See Id. at 894-95.
204
Id.
205
Id.
206
Id. at 895.
207
Id. The City did cite to a National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health report on the dangers of improperly ventilated shooting ranges to the
environment, but the same report included guidelines on techniques for how to avoid
those consequences. Id.
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the risks to public safety and health from fire or environmental
hazards. 208 Furthermore, insofar as there was evidence of risks, Judge
Sykes noted that the City had promulgated a host of other regulations
on the proper construction and operation of firing ranges which would
alleviate many of the safety concerns without necessitating zoning or
distance requirements. 209 These construction requirements had been
upheld by the District Court and were not on appeal. 210
While Judge Sykes did not dismiss the general concerns of the
city to public health and safety, in the end she stated that “there must
be evidence” to support the City’s rational. 211 The lack of such
evidence meant that the city had failed to establish a “close fit”
between the regulations and their justification, and they were
unconstitutional under the “strong form of intermediate scrutiny” or
the “not quite strict scrutiny” that the court was applying. 212
In terms of the ban on minors, Judge Sykes noted that there was
“zero historical evidence that firearm training” for minors under 18
was “categorically unprotected,” and neither the City nor the Court
could find any evidence to the contrary. 213 Furthermore, the cases
relied upon by the City all dealt with prohibitions on minors
“possessing, purchasing, or carrying firearms, 214 and the only Seventh
Circuit case related to minors dealt with a parental signature

208

Id.
Id.
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
Id. at 896.
214
See, e.g., NRA v. McCraw, 719 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 2013) (upholding a state
law banning 18- to 20-year-olds from carrying handguns in public); NRA v BATFE,
700 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding a federal law prohibiting 18- to 21-yearolds from purchasing a handgun); United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8 (1st Cir.
2009) (upholding a federal law prohibiting juvenile handgun possession); People v.
Mosley, 33 N.E.3d 137 (2015) (upholding a state law banning 18- to 20-year-olds
from carrying handguns outside the home).
209
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requirement for so called “FOID” cards. 215 Because the City could not
prove minors were categorically excluded, the court preceded to the
second step. Again, the City had little evidence other than generalized
assertions about the safety of children, with one of their own witnesses
admitting that the best place for minors to train with firearms would in
fact be a controlled firing range. 216 The City offered many other
general justifications based on child development and health, but with
no concrete evidence the categorical ban could not withstand
constitutional scrutiny. 217
B. Judge Rovner: Separating and Weighing the Heavy Public
Interests
Judge Rovner, again finding herself writing separately, restated
the sliding-scale test from Ezell I and her own contradictory assertion
from that case that the right to participate in range training was not an
“important corollary” to the core right of self defense but was, at most
ancillary to the core right. 218 Judge Rovner argued that for the
purposes of the current dispute “we can ignore whether there is a
difference in these two descriptions and assume that the right is an
important one: although not part and parcel of the core right, close to
but subordinate to it. How far subordinate is yet unknown.” 219 What
Judge Rovner and the majority did agree on was that this case was
different, and that what they were reviewing was not an outright ban
but a “regulation of where when and how firing ranges may
operate.” 220 Interestingly, Judge Rovner did not seek to characterize
215

See Horsley v Trame, 808 F.3d. 1126, 1127 (7th Cir. 2015). The Seventh
Circuit panel in Horsley did not answer the question of whether minors are
categorically excluded from the Second Amendment, as the district court in Ezell II
believed they were, but rather the Horsley court had held the FOID card requirement
satisfied intermediate scrutiny whatever the scope of minor’s rights. Id.
216
Ezell II, 846 F.3d at 897.
217
See id. at 898.
218
Id. at 899 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
219
Id.
220
Id.
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these firing-range regulations as “time, place and manner” restrictions
as she had in Ezell I, but instead stated in a footnote that the term “is
heavily loaded with attachments to a particular level of scrutiny under
First Amendment jurisprudence—a quagmire better to avoid in this
case.” 221
Now eschewing labels of the proper level of scrutiny herself,
Judge Rovner instead focused on the manner of the majority’s
application of the two-part test, and specifically the assertion, “without
any rationale,” that the manufacturing district and distance
requirements “stand or fall together.” 222 Judge Rovner agreed with the
majority on the manufacturing district requirement being
unconstitutional on the lack of evidentiary support but was highly
critical of Judge Sykes’ claim that the zoning requirement necessarily
fell with it. 223 Judge Rovner agreed that there was a lack of any
“robust, reliable evidence” tying the manufacturing district
requirement to the actual public safety justifications offered by the
City, and that the “generalized propositions that firing ranges pose a
danger—in terms of both crime and environmental impact—did not
justify restricting them to manufacturing districts only as opposed to
other industrial zones.” 224
However, Judge Rovner noted that unlike the manufacturing
regulation, which made a categorical determination on where a
particular land used belongs, the distancing regulation was a “much
more focused determination of how close a particular use (which may
have unique impacts) may be to other uses.” 225 In Judge Rovner’s
view, under a sliding scale levels of scrutiny test, the two regulations
had to be addressed separately because they had separate government
rationales and separate effects on the public interest of Chicago
citizens. 226
221

Id. n. 2.
Id. at 900.
223
See id. at 899-900.
224
Id at 901.
225
Id. at 900.
226
Id.
222
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Judge Rovner proceeded to evaluate these interests and
regulations separately, and even though she came to the same
conclusion on the manufacturing district requirement, she reached the
opposite on the distance requirements. 227 For the distance requirement,
Judge Rovner first noted that, on its own, it did not impact as much of
the available land in the city as it did when taken together with the
zoning requirement, which only made about 10.6% percent of the land
in the city available for firing ranges. 228 On its own, the distancing
requirement did not reduce the available land as much; therefore, it
“imposed a significantly lighter burden on the placement of firing
ranges,” and the sliding-scale test from Ezell I dictated that “a lighter
burden requires a lesser justification.” 229 Where the zoning
requirement was a blanket prohibition for all firing ranges in every
area except manufacturing districts, the distancing regulation was a
“precise and targeted approach” to protect areas that the city “routinely
singles out for protection—places where children and the sick are
gathered, for example.” 230 Thus, the difference between the two was
the “difference between a carpet bomb and a surgical strike,” and the
evaluation of the public benefit was vastly different. 231
Moreover, Judge Rovner disagreed with the majority regarding
the “sensitive places” language from Heller regarding longstanding
historical prohibitions on “carrying of firearms in sensitive places such
as schools and government buildings.” 232 Judge Rovner declined to
opine whether this language indicated a categorical exception for such
regulations but argued that it was enough to support the conclusion
that a “sufficiently strong public interest” justified regulations
distancing these “sensitive places” from firing ranges. 233

227

Id.
Id. at 902.
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
Id. (emphasis in original).
233
Id.
228

90

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol13/iss1/3

40

: Between Scylla and Charybdis: <i>Ezell v. City of Chicago (Ezell

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 13

Fall 2017

Judge Rovner also criticized the majority’s argument that the
distancing requirement, specifically regarding the distance from
residential areas, was incompatible with Heller’s main premise of
keeping a gun in the home for self-defense. As Judge Rovner noted:
[k]eeping or even carrying a firearm for self-defense poses a
substantially different risk than does creating a public
accommodation where large numbers of people will gather
with firearms loaded with lead-contaminated, explosive-filled
ammunition and fire them. Firing a gun poses significantly
greater risks than the mere keeping or carrying of a gun, in
terms of potential accidents, attractiveness to criminals, and
environmental lead exposure. 234
In short, the uniquely dangerous nature of guns, and firing ranges with
large quantities of them being regularly discharged, as well as the
interests in preventing theft in crime, all “cause a heavy weight on the
public interest side of the scale” 235
In terms of evidence, Judge Rovner noted that in the First
Amendment context the Supreme Court had rejected any requirement
for empirical data showing an ordinance will successfully lower
crime. 236 While the City could not tie any evidence to the
manufacturing district requirement, they did have evidentiary support
for their argument that locating firing ranges near vulnerable
populations and residences carried risks that could be alleviated
through distancing requirements. 237Judge Rovner noted this evidence
in the numerous other examples in the City code of setting distancing
requirements which created a “buffer zone” between dangerous or
adult-themed businesses and sensitive areas such as schools or

234

Id. at 903.
Id.
236
Id.
237
Id. at 903-904.
235
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hospitals. 238 This support, along with the heavy public interest
rational, was enough to allow the distancing regulations to survive
constitutional scrutiny in Judge Rovner’s view. 239
Finally, in terms of the ban on minors, Judge Rovner agreed that
the City had failed to show any evidence supporting the categorical
exclusion of minors from firing ranges under the Second
Amendment. 240 However, Judge Rovner noted that in the First
Amendment context, the rights of minors are limited to different
degrees in different contexts,241 and that even beyond that “it goes
without saying that the government may restrict the rights of minors
for the purposes of protecting their health and safety.” 242 Pointing to
examples of the “long history of protecting minors, even where
fundamental rights are in play,” Judge Rovner felt it important to note
that where an outright ban on entering firing ranges was too far, a
variety of “stringent regulations for minors in firing ranges would
withstand much scrutiny when supported by appropriate evidence.” 243
C. The State of the Two-Step Test and Gun Control Legislation
in the Seventh Circuit after Ezell II
The majority opinion in Ezell II is interesting not only because it
further cemented the use of the two-step sliding-scale analysis
established in Ezell I, but also because Judge Sykes avoided stating
with clarity what level of scrutiny on that scale was being applied.
238

See id. (citing to municipal distancing restrictions for “machine shops,”
“nitrocellulose” manufacturing facilities, slaughter houses, and the operation of
unmanned aircraft).
239
Id. at 904.
240
Id.
240
Id. (“To the extent that McDonald and its progeny allow for firearm
ownership within the City of Chicago, the practical argument that parents who have
guns within the City limits might also wish to teach gun safety to their children is not
without merit.”).
241
Id at 904-905.
242
Id. at 905.
243
Id.
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After characterizing the level of scrutiny from Ezell I as “a strong form
of intermediate scrutiny,” and requiring a “close fit,” the opinion
focuses largely on the lack of evidence proffered by the city and a
failure to show more than mere general and speculative health and
safety concerns. 244 It is true that the hard evidence was particularly
lacking for the manufacturing district requirement and the requirement
would likely have failed under any standard of review. 245 Indeed, that
the manufacturing ban would have failed regardless of the standard of
scrutiny perhaps answers the question of why Judge Sykes concluded
that the distancing requirement—which seemed on more solid footing
on its own—necessarily had to fall with it. 246 As Judge Rovner noted,
the correct application of the sliding scale test would have seen the
two restrictions analyzed separately and on its own the distancing
requirement should have survived. 247
Regardless of the decision to examine both regulations
together, it is important to highlight the standard of review the court
used in Ezell II because of its implications on future decisions. Based
on the discussion of Ezell I, we can assume that what Judge Sykes was
applying was the same “not quite strict scrutiny” or “strong form of
intermediate scrutiny” she had previously described and applied to
regulations affecting firearm training. 248 Similarly for Judge Rovner,
though she also avoided explicit description of any standard of
scrutiny, we can likely assume that she was applying a form of

244

See id at 896 (majority opinion).
See id. at 901-902 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(observing that the City’s limited evidence that the manufacturing requirement
prevented lead contamination at most established a rational basis for the law, which
was not enough to survive review).
246
Id. at 894 (majority opinion).
247
Id. at 900 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
248
See id. at 892-93 (majority opinion) (“We take as settled what was
established in Ezell I . . . This holding and these observations control here.).
245
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intermediate scrutiny appropriate for “time, place, manner” gun use
restrictions, based on her allusions to her own opinion in Ezell I. 249
While in Ezell I the distinction may not have been important
because the complete ban on firing ranges would have failed under
either level, 250 we can see in Ezell II why it is vitally important what
standard of scrutiny on the sliding scale the courts apply. Applying
intermediate scrutiny for time, place, and manner style gun restrictions
as Judge Rovner has advocated would have almost certainly led the
distancing requirement to survive review. 251 But, by characterizing the
right in a manner that requires what is essentially strict scrutiny
review, Judge Sykes has all but ensured that regulations involving
firing ranges, or implicating this right to live fire arm training, must
necessarily fail. While the City failed to present more than speculative
evidence for the manufacturing zoning requirement, and their evidence
for the distancing requirements was far from robust, 252 one is left to
wonder how much evidence they would have to muster to meet a
standard of review akin to strict scrutiny.
The result in Ezell II is also ironic given Judge Sykes’ own words
in Ezell I encouraging Chicago to replace its total ban on ranges with
zoning regulations. 253 Judge Sykes incorrectly discounted the Supreme
Court’s language from Heller regarding the validity of longstanding
249

See id. at 899 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(describing her disagreement with the majority in Ezell I has how to characterize the
right to range training).
250
See Ezell I, 651 F. 3d 684, 712 (Rovner, J. concurring).
251
See Ezell II, 846 F.3d at 904 (Rovner, J. concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“given the lighter burden imposed by the distancing regulations, the strong
public interest in protecting residential areas and sensitive areas from the risks
associated with firing ranges, these regulations pass constitutional muster”); see also
Ezell I, 651 F. 3d at 712 (Rovner, J. concurring) (“The City has a right to impose
reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on the operation of live ranges in the
interest of public safety and other legitimate governmental concerns.”).
252
See Ezell II, 846 F. 3d at 901-02 (Rovner, J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
253
Ezell I, 651 F. 3d at 709 (“on this record [the City’s] concerns are entirely
speculative and, in any event, can be addressed through sensible zoning and other
appropriately tailored regulations.”
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prohibitions on carrying guns in “sensitive places” like schools. 254
Judge Sykes conclusion that the distancing requirements were not a
“limitation on where firearms may be carried” and thus did not fall
under the “sensitive places” language in Heller was erroneous. 255
Quite the opposite, firing ranges are places with high concentrations of
firearms being carried and discharged in one location. 256 It seems
obvious that restricting how close these firing ranges can be located to
schools and residences falls squarely within the coverage of the
Supreme Court’s language on presumptively valid longstanding
prohibitions on the carrying of guns in “sensitive places.” 257 If nothing
else, they would seem to be the kind of “sensible zoning” restrictions
that Judge Sykes herself encouraged the City to pursue. 258 Indeed, as
Judge Rovner noted in her dissent, the City has commonly enacted
similar distancing restrictions on how close dangerous businesses can
be located to places that serve vulnerable populations at schools or
hospitals. 259
254

See Ezell II, 846 F.3d at 894-95.
See id at 902 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
256
See id. at 903 (“owning, keeping or even carrying a firearm for self-defense
poses a substantially different risk than does creating a public accommodation where
large numbers of people will gather with firearms loaded with lead-contaminated,
explosive-filled ammunition and fire them.”).
257
See id.
258
See Ezell I, 651 F.3d at 709.
259
See Ezell II, 846 F.3d at 903 (Rovner, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). A related argument, which Judge Rovner does not directly address, would
be to draw an analogy between analyzing zoning and distancing requirements under
the Second Amendment to how courts have approached zoning restrictions on adult
book stores and theaters under the First Amendment. See Second Amendment Arms
v. City of Chicago, 135 F. Supp. 3d 743, 754 (N.D. Ill. 2015). The district court in
Second Amendment Arms considered this very possibility in a case involving similar
Chicago zoning ordinances which limited the location of firearms retailers. Id. The
court rejected the use of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment burden shifting
framework for zoning restrictions of adult-use businesses. Id. The court said the
framework was a poor fit in the Second Amendment context because regulations on
the commercial sale of fire-arms fell into Heller’s language regarding presumptively
valid longstanding regulations. See id. Interesting then, and contrary to the Ezell II
255
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For now, Ezell II is binding precedent in the Circuit, and lower
courts that encounter regulations that burden, or could be seen as
burdening, this “right to maintain proficiency in firearm use,” will
presumably be bound to apply this “strong form of intermediate
scrutiny.” 260 Of course, the flexibility inherent in the sliding-scale
means-end test should still allow other panels or district courts in the
Seventh Circuit to apply the more deferential form of intermediate
scrutiny for other gun regulations that only implicate the “time, place,
and manner” of firearm use.
The full effects of this precedent remain to be seen, but what
can be said is Ezell II gives support to courts to apply a heightened
standard of review akin to strict scrutiny to strike down gun control
regulations. The use of this stringent standard of review for regulations
that in reality only regulate the time, place, and manner of firearm use
is wholly inappropriate and ultimately dangerous given the unique
public safety risks involved.
CONCLUSION
After initially asking for a delay in the injunctions ordered by the
Seventh Circuit, the City withdrew its motion. 261 Thus, after seven
years the Ezell litigation appears to have come to a close. While it
remains to be see how the City will respond to the ordinances being
struck down, we can assume for the time being that construction of
firing ranges can soon begin without concern for their distance from
schools, residential areas, or high crime areas where their concentrated
stock of guns could be susceptible to theft.
This result has very real effects for the people of Chicago, whom
are already struggling with an unprecedented level of gun violence
causing injury and death in their city. Obviously, preventing the
construction of firing ranges in practical terms does nothing to
court, the district court in Second Amendment Arms upheld the zoning restrictions
based on the strong presumption of their validity under the language in Heller. Id.
260
Ezell II, 846 F.3d at 893 (majority opinion).
261
See docket report for, Ezell et al., v. City of Chicago, 1:10CV05135.
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affirmatively lower the current historical levels of gun violence.
However, given the uniquely dangerous nature of fire arms and the
extraordinary risk they pose to public safety, it is not hard to
understand the City’s desire to enact whatever control measures they
can. Indeed, it appears a fairly legitimate concern that allowing firing
ranges, with their high concentrations of firearms packed in one
location, might make the task of limiting the number of guns on the
street more difficult.
That task has been made monumentally more difficult in the
current Second Amendment constitutional regime. After McDonald
foreclosed the City’s complete bans on handgun ownership, the realm
of permissible regulation has only been further narrowed in the years
since. Ezell I and II, though focused on the seemingly confined issue
of firing range training, have great implications for future attempts at
regulation. Any future gun control measures that implicate this newly
recognized right to live firearm training seem destined to fall under the
strict scrutiny review used by the court.
The time will soon come for the en banc Seventh Circuit to clarify
the position for the lower courts that encounter Second Amendment
challenges. If presented with the opportunity, the en banc court should
use Judge Rovner’s opinions in both Ezell I & II as examples of how
to correctly apply the the two-step test for the Second Amendment.
Local governments like Chicago do have their own responsibility in
future lawsuits to present better and more concrete empirical evidence
to support the public health justifications for their proposed gun
control measures. In turn, these local governments need courts to
apply the appropriate standard of review. That standard needs to be
one where gun control regulations that only affect the “time, place and
manner” of firearm use, or other ancillary conduct unconnected with
self-defense in the home, are only subject to intermediate scrutiny.
In the meantime, Chicago has been left, as Judge Rovner
sympathized, navigating a narrow straight between a dreaded “Scylla
and Charybdis.” On one hand, the City faces a gun violence epidemic
garnering national attention and threating the health and safety of its
citizens on a daily basis. On the other, there is an expanding realm of
protected Second Amendment activities historically unconnected to
97
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the past and far beyond the original right to self-defense in the home
recognized in Heller. The City will have to continue to experiment
with gun control regulations to find those measures that can tread this
narrow constitutional path forward.
Of course, in the absence of similar regulations in neighboring
jurisdictions, the actual impact of any local regulations on gun
violence is very much an open question. In the end, any truly effective
measure to combat the City’s gun violence problem will likely require
a more national scale.
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